INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION

Visiting Professor Anthea Roberts

Fall Term 2011

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Course Details
3 classroom credits LAW-40265A
Fall Term, Block A
Mondays and Tuesdays: 8:40 AM - 10:10 AM

Course Description
This course introduces students to international investment treaty law and investment treaty arbitration. Investment treaty arbitration is a new and fast-paced area that involves a unique blend of public international law, international commercial arbitration and public law principles. The course covers (1) the theoretical and policy background to investment treaties and dispute settlement by arbitration, (2) the institutions and rules that govern investor-state arbitration, (3) the substantive principles and standards that may apply to the investor-state relationship under investment treaties (i.e., national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, expropriation, and fair and equitable treatment), (4) disputed areas, such as the relationship between investment treaties and investment contracts, human rights and environmental protection, and (5) defenses, including necessity. The course examines controversial cases (e.g., the arbitrations against Argentina following its 2001 economic crisis) and theoretical questions (e.g., the legitimacy of law-making by investment tribunals).

Reading:
Reading is divided into Primary Texts, Essential Reading and Further Reading. Each week you will be expected to have read the Primary Texts and Essential Reading. You are encouraged to read items from the Further Reading, particularly in preparation for the exam. The most important items on the Further Reading are marked with an asterisk.

Required Texts:

Assessment: The course will be assessed by a 100% written examination. The examination will be based on the assigned readings and class discussion.
COURSE OUTLINE

1. Introduction: historical and policy background
2. Consent to arbitration, arbitral institutions and rules
3. Theoretical perspectives, applicable law and interpretation
4. Jurisdiction: personal and subject matter jurisdiction
5. Standards: expropriation and public policy concerns
6. Standards: national treatment and most favored nation treatment
7. Standards: fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security
8. Defenses: Necessity and Countermeasures
9. Awards: annulment, challenge and enforcement
10. Lawmaking, legitimacy and conflicting decisions
11. Fairness and future of investment treaty arbitration
1. **Introduction: historical and policy background of investment treaties**

**Dates: September 12 and 13, 2011**

This seminar introduces the history of and policy behind investment treaties. Investment treaties are signed between two or more states with each state promising to give certain protections to investors of the other states. Typically, investment treaties contain two important elements. First, they contain substantive provisions which set out the standards by which each state promises to treat the investors of the other state/s. Secondly, most investment treaties contain a procedural mechanism to deal with disputes about compliance with these treatment standards. In most cases, this mechanism permits investors to bring claims directly against the host state before an international arbitral tribunal. This seminar focuses primarily on the first issue, while the next seminar focuses primarily on the second issue.

When it comes to standards of protection, there has traditionally been a division between capital-exporting states, which have sought extensive investor protection, and capital-importing states, which have sought greater regulatory freedom for states and correspondingly less extensive protections for investors. This seminar examines why this is the case and the way in which this divergence has influenced the development of customary international law and multilateral treaty standards. It also traces the rise of bilateral treaties (such as those based on the UK and US model BITs) and regional investment treaties (such as NAFTA), asking why states have been prepared to enter into these treaties but not a multilateral treaty. Finally, the seminar introduces some of the academic and civil society critiques of investment treaties, which is a topic that will be continued in the Week 2.

In completing the reading, consider the following questions:

- **History and policy** (Van Harten, Guzman, Alvarez): What is an investor/investment? What investor protection rules have capital-exporting states traditionally advocated and why? What investor protection rules have capital-importing states traditionally advocated and why? What is the status of each approach as a matter of customary international law and how and why has this changed over time? Have there been negotiations over a multilateral investment treaty and what has become of these and why?

- **Bilateral and regional investment treaties** (Van Harten, Guzman, Franck, Lowe): When did states begin entering into these treaties and when did they become particularly popular? What is the profile of states likely to enter into investment treaties and how has this changed over time? Do investment treaties create equal and reciprocal rights and obligations between states? Why are developing states prepared to enter into investment treaties at all? Why are developing states prepared to enter into bilateral and regional treaties but not a multilateral investment treaty?

- **Critiques** (Van Harten, NGO in class handout): What are some of the main concerns raised by the NGO community about investment treaties? What case study does Van Harten use to illustrate his concerns about investment treaties? Do you think these concerns are justified?
A. Primary Texts

- NAFTA, Chapter 11, Section A
- US Model BIT, Arts 1-6
- UK Model BIT, Arts 1-5

B. Essential Reading

- R Dolzer and C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2008), Ch 1

C. Further Reading


2. Consent to arbitration, arbitral institutions and rules

Dates: September 19 and 20, 2011

This seminar examines the most important procedural development contained in most investment treaties: investors being permitted to bring arbitration claims directly against states. Traditionally, investors had two options for resolving disputes with a host state, neither of which were satisfactory: they could bring a claim in the local courts of the host state or they could seek international diplomatic protection from their home state. By contrast, many investment treaties allow investors to bring claims directly against host states before international arbitral tribunals, without having to rely on a contract between the investor and the state. This seminar explores how states consent to such arbitration and why this is controversial. It also introduces the two main forms of international arbitration: institutional (e.g., ICSID) and non institutional (e.g., UNCITRAL). As the majority of investment treaty disputes are heard under the ICSID Convention,
the seminar looks at some of the basic requirements of ICSID jurisdiction. Picking up on the academic and civil society critiques of investment treaties from the 1st seminar, we then look at empirical evaluations of investment treaty arbitration.

In completing the reading, consider the following questions:

- **Investor-state disputes and arbitration without privity** (UNCTAD, Paulsson, Van Harten): What options exist for bringing investment disputes before national courts and what are the advantages and disadvantages of this approach? When may a state exercise diplomatic protection and what are the advantages and disadvantages of this approach? What are the advantages and disadvantages of allowing investors to bring claims directly against states before the international arbitral tribunals? How can a state consent to investment arbitration? Why does Paulsson describe investment treaties as creating arbitration without privity? How does this approach differ to states entering commercial contracts which include arbitration clauses (Paulsson, Van Harten)?

- **ICSID** (UNCTAD): What is the difference between institutional and non-institutional arbitration? When and why was ICSID negotiated? What is the difference between the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules? Does being a party to the ICSID Convention equate to consenting to arbitration? Does ICSID include substantive treatment standards? What is the relationship between bringing an ICSID case and exhausting local remedies and seeking diplomatic protection?

- **Empirical evaluation of disputes** (Franck): Which states are investors most likely to come from and which states are they most likely to sue? Are investor claimants or developing states more likely to win? What damages are claimed and what damages are awarded? How does this research affect your understanding of the fairness of investment treaty arbitration? What are some of the problems with this sort of empirical analysis?

A. **Primary Texts**
- ICSID Convention, Arts 25-27
- NAFTA, Chapter 11, Section B
- US Model BIT, Arts 24-26
- UK Model BIT, Art 8

B. **Essential Reading**
3. **Theoretical underpinnings, applicable law and interpretation**

**Dates: September 26 and 27, 2011**

This seminar examines to what extent investment treaty arbitration is a form of public international law, international commercial arbitration and/or public law. Investment treaty arbitration is often thought of as a subset of public international law or as a species of international commercial arbitration, but it has important differences to both. This seminar examines the applicable law in investment treaty arbitration, which is commonly a combination of public international law and national law. The seminar also considers the interpretation of investment treaties and how this may be influenced by our understanding of investment treaty arbitration as a form of public international law, international commercial arbitration, investor rights regime or public law. We then explore a series of controversial issues (including amicus briefs and interpretive statements) to see how the answers to them might depend on the framework we adopt.

In completing the reading, consider the following questions:

- **Theoretical underpinnings** (Van Harten, Douglas, Roberts, Alvarez, Schill): What are the characteristics of public international law? What are the characteristics of international commercial arbitration? Why does Van Harten argue that investment treaty arbitration should be understood as distinct from public international law and international commercial arbitration? Why does he argue that investment treaty arbitration represents a form of public law? What are the pros and cons of this approach? Are investment treaties akin to human rights treaties?

- **Applicable law**: What rule does ICSID adopt regarding the applicable law? Do the states that enter into investment treaties have the right to determine the applicable law? What happens if they do not make a choice of law? If the states choose domestic laws, will the international law have any application? What applicable law has been chosen in the US Model BIT and NAFTA?

- **Interpretation** (Van Harten, Dolzer/Schreuer, Roberts): What are the general rules for interpreting treaties set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and how do these apply in investment treaty arbitration? How, if at all, do different interpretative approaches (analogies with public international law, international commercial arbitration, human rights and public law) impact upon interpretation? What is the NAFTA Free Trade Commission and how have NAFTA tribunals responded to its interpretations (compare *Pope & Talbot, Mondev* and *ADF*)? Was the FTC’s Interpretive Note a valid exercise of sovereign power or an abuse of process? Would you recommend that all BITs contain an equivalent to the FTC?
A. **Primary Texts**

- US Model BIT, Arts 30-31

B. **Essential Reading**

- R Dolzer and C Schreuer, *Principles of International Investment Law* (2008), Ch 2 (pages 31-38)

C. **Further Reading**


4. **Jurisdiction: personal and subject matter jurisdiction**

**Dates: October 3 and 4, 2011**

This seminar focuses on personal and subject matter jurisdiction for tribunals hearing investment treaty claims, particularly those under the ICSID Convention. Most investment treaty claims are brought by investors from home State A against host State B on the basis of an investment treaty
between States A and B. In order for a tribunal to have jurisdiction, it must find that the investor is a “national” of State A (personal jurisdiction) and that the claim relates to an “investment” in State B (subject matter jurisdiction). This seminar explores the relevant tests for “nationality” of individuals (natural persons) and companies (juridical persons) and for “investments” under the ICSID Convention and certain Model BITs.

In completing the reading, consider the following questions:

- **Relationship between ICSID and BITs/MITs**: What is the relationship between the jurisdictional tests set out in ICSID and those in investment treaties? If the case is bought under the ICSID Convention, can investment treaties narrow or expand the jurisdiction set out in the Convention?

- **Personal Jurisdiction - Nationality**: What are the tests for determining whether an individual investor is a national of another contracting state under ICSID and investment treaties? What are the tests for determining whether a company investor is a national of another contracting state under ICSID and investment treaties? When can domestic companies be treated as foreign nationals? What are the advantages and disadvantages of adopting a formal legal test (e.g., the Tokios majority) versus a contextual, factual test (e.g., the Tokios dissent)? How do the majority and minority in TSA Spectrum approach this issue? Is structuring or restructuring corporate nationality to take advantage of favorable BITs legal and/or ethical?

- **Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Investment**: What are the tests for determining whether the claim relates to an investment under ICSID and investment treaties? Have tribunals taken a broad or narrow approach to the definition of investment (Fedax, MHS Annulment)? When will tribunals find that a claim does not relate to an investment (Joy Mining)? What is the rationale for protecting investments but not sales of goods?

A. **Primary Texts**

- ICSID Convention, Arts 25(1) and (2)
- NAFTA, Annex 201.1
- US Model BIT, Arts 1 and 2
- UK Model BIT, Art 1
B. Essential Reading

- R Dolzer and C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2008), Ch 3

C. Further Reading


5. **Standards: expropriation**

Dates: October 11 and make up class on October 13, 2011
We now turn to consider the main substantive protections provided by most BITs, starting with expropriation. International law does not prevent a state from directly or indirectly expropriating foreign investments, but such expropriation is legal only if it is for a public purpose, is non-discriminatory, accords with due process and is accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective compensation. This seminar focuses on the tests for direct and indirect expropriation: direct expropriation involves a taking or transfer of ownership rights, whereas indirect expropriation involves actions that have the effect of substantially depriving the investor of the benefits of ownership. We then use case studies to examine how these tests are applied to various facts, focusing on tribunals struggling to draw the line between lawful government regulation (particularly for concerns such as protection of the environment, health and safety, and human rights) and compensable expropriation.

In completing the reading, consider the following questions:

- **Definitions**: What is the test for direct expropriation? What is the test for indirect expropriation? Is there a difference between indirect expropriation, measures equivalent to or tantamount to expropriation, and creeping expropriation? What degree or duration of interference is required to establish expropriation? Is indirect expropriation determined by the government’s subjective intention in passing the measure, or the objective effect of the measure on the investor?

- **Metalclad**: What test did the Tribunal establish for expropriation and was it broad or narrow? On what basis or bases did the Tribunal find that Mexico had expropriated Metalclad’s investment? Did the Tribunal give adequate consideration to Mexico’s environmental concerns? What did the Canadian court say about the Tribunal’s test for and findings on expropriation?

- **Saluka/Feldman**: What does the Feldman Tribunal say about the distinction between indirect expropriation, measures tantamount to expropriation and creeping expropriation? What does the Feldman Tribunal view as the fundamental question about expropriation (legitimate regulation versus compensable expropriation)? What test does the Saluka Tribunal set down about police powers versus compensable expropriation?

- **Rationale**: What is the rationale for paying compensation for diminished values that result from regulatory action (Been/Beauvais)? Consider the arguments of cost-internalization, fairness, insurance and encouraging investment. Is it fair for foreign investors to be protected by international law if domestic investors are not similarly protected under national law?

**A. Primary Texts**

- NAFTA Chapter 11, Art 1110
- US Model BIT, Arts 6 and 12, Annexes A and B
B. Essential Reading


C. Further reading

- R Dolzer and C Schreuer, *Principles of International Investment Law* (2008), Ch 6

6. Standards: national treatment and most favored nation treatment

**Dates: October 17 and 18, 2011**

This seminar focuses on the contingent treatment standards of national treatment and most favored nation treatment. These standards are contingent because they require an examination of the treatment of a foreign investor compared to (1) domestic investors in like circumstances (national treatment) and (2) other foreign investors (most favored nation treatment). The national treatment provision requires identification of domestic investors in like circumstances, consideration of whether the foreign investor has been treated less favorably than these investors, and an analysis of whether this differentiation can be justified. The most favored nation provision allows investors under one investment treaty to rely on more favorable treatment in other investment treaties by the same state, though it is controversial whether this applies to substantive obligations only or also to dispute settlement provisions.
In completing the reading, consider the following questions:

- **Contingent vs Non-Contingent Standards**: What is the difference between treatment standards that are contingent and non-contingent? Are the following treatment standards contingent or non-contingent: national treatment, most favored nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and full protection and security? What is the relationship between finding a breach of a contingent standard and finding a breach of a non-contingent standard?

- **National Treatment**: What steps are required to find a violation of the national treatment standard? What does the phrase “like circumstances” mean and how have different tribunals applied it (*SD Myers, Feldman, ADF*)? Is differential treatment accorded to foreign and domestic investors judged according to the intention of the measure and/or the actual effects of the measure (*SD Myers, Feldman, ADF*)? Will a violation of national treatment be found if the differential treatment can be justified on rational grounds and how do such justifications relate to the test for likeness (*SD Myers, Pope & Talbot, Feldman*)? Does national treatment involve a comparison with the average national or the best treated national?

- **Most Favored Nation Treatment**: How does a basic most favored nation provision operate? What is an example of an uncontroversial application of a most favored nation clause? What is an example of a controversial application of a most favored nation clause? Do you prefer the reasoning in *Maffezini* (applying the clause to a dispute settlement provision) or *Plama* (refusing to apply the clause to a dispute settlement provision)? Do the public policy exceptions identified in *Maffezini* provide rational exceptions to the general rule identified by the Tribunal or do they undermine the existence of that general rule? Is it possible to rationally reconcile the decisions in *Maffezini* and *Plama*?

### A. Primary Texts
- NAFTA, Arts 1102, 1103 and 1104
- US Model BIT, Arts 3 and 4
- UK Model BIT, Art 3

### B. Essential Reading
C. Further Reading

- R Dolzer and C Schreuer, *Principles of International Investment Law* (2008), Ch 7, Parts 8 and 9 (national treatment, most favored nation treatment) and Ch 10, Part (2)(g) (pages 253-57, most favored nation treatment)
- *Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada*, Award (10 April 2001), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Award_Merits2001_04_10_Pope_001.pdf (focus on the examination of national treatment, paras 18-29, 73-104 (particularly 75-79))
- *ADF Group Inc. v United States of America*, Award (9 January 2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ADF-award_000.pdf (focus on the examination of national treatment, paras 1, 44-55, 147-158)

7. Standards: fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security

Dates: October 24 and 25, 2011

This seminar focuses on the non-contingent treatment standards of fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. These standards are non-contingent because they require an examination of the treatment of a foreign investor compared to an objective standard of treatment, rather than a comparison of how the investor has been treated compared with other domestic and foreign investors. The fair and equitable treatment obligation is important and relatively open-ended, dealing with denial of justice in court proceedings and decisions, and unfair and inequitable administrative decision making. The requirement to provide full protection and security refers to the obligation of states to exercise due diligence in order to protect investors and their property from damage by state officials or others.

In completing the reading, consider the following questions:

- **Relationship of Non-Contingent Standards**: How does the fair and equitable treatment standard relate to (1) the minimum treatment obligation under customary international law and (2) violations of other treaty provisions, particularly national treatment (*Pope & Talbot, Metalclad, FTC interpretation, Thomas)? What role have academics played in the development of this standard (Thomas)? Is it fair for foreign investors to be protected under international law if domestic investors do not get equivalent protection?

- **Fair and Equitable Treatment**: Fair and equitable treatment deals with (1) denials of justice by domestic courts and (2) unfair and inequitable treatment in administrative decision making.

1. Denial of justice: When dealing with these claims, are Tribunals functioning as courts of appeal (*Mondev, Loewen*)? Is it necessary to exhaust domestic remedies in order to make a claim for denial of justice under a fair and equitable treatment provision (*Loewen*)? What do you think of the outcome of and analysis in *Loewen*?
2. Administrative decisions: What does the obligation to protect an investor’s legitimate expectations mean in practice (Tecmed, Metalclad)? How do Tribunal’s balance an investor’s expectations against a state’s right to regulate (Saluka)? What are the requirements of due process (Tecmed, Metalclad)?

- **Full Protection and Security**: What obligations are imposed on states under this provision (AAPL)? Does a state need to participate in initial wrongdoing to become liable (AAPL, AMT, Wena)? Does the provision create a strict liability standard for any harm to investments (AAPL)?

A. **Primary Texts**
- NAFTA, Art 1105
- US Model BIT, Art 5 and Annex A
- UK Model BIT, Art 2

B. **Essential Reading**
- *Mondev International Ltd v USA*, Award (11 October 2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Mondev-Final.pdf (focus on the examination of the merits review for denial of justice, paras 93-159)
C. Further Reading

- R Dolzer and C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2008), Ch 7, Parts 1, 2 and 4 (fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, denial of Justice)
- The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v United States of America, Award (26 June 2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Loewen-Award-2.pdf (focus on the examination of procedural fairness and exhaustion of local remedies, paras 1-10, 39-217)
- Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Republic of Sri Lanka, Award (1990), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AsianAgriculture-Award.pdf (focus on the examination of full protection and security, paras 26-86, particularly 43-86)
- J Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (Cambridge, 2005)

8. Defenses: Necessity and Countermeasures

Dates: October 31 and November 1, 2011

This seminar focuses on what defenses states can raise to investment claims, looking in particular at necessity and countermeasures. In a series of cases against Argentina arising out of the 2001 economic crisis, Argentina pleaded that its actions were excused on the basis of necessity under the provisions of the relevant investment treaties and customary international law. This defense raises important questions about the nature and scope of non-precluded measures provisions in investment treaties and how these provisions relate to circumstances precluding wrongfulness under customary international law. In a series of cases arising under NAFTA, Mexico pleaded that a tax levied on corn syrup was a legitimate countermeasure in response to previous violations of NAFTA committed by the United States. This defense raises important questions about the availability of inter-state defenses in investor-state disputes.

In completing the reading, consider the following questions:

- **Necessity**: Should Argentina have had the right to respond to its economic crisis in the way that it did or were its actions exactly the sort of actions that investment treaties were intended to prevent? What is the relationship between treaty exceptions and defenses under customary international law? Do you think that Art XI of the US-Argentina BIT should be interpreted by reference to the customary international law rules on necessity (CMS) or the international trade law rules on exceptions (Continental) or neither? Is Art XI self-judging and are there any problems with states inserting self-judging provisions? Can the various elements of the customary international law defense of necessity sensibly apply in the context of economic crises (e.g., a state cannot have contributed to the emergency, the state’s response must be the only means available to it). What effect should a successful necessity defense have?
• **Countermeasures**: Do investment treaties give investors substantive and/or procedural rights? Does the answer to this question impact upon the availability of inter-state countermeasures in investor-state disputes? Who has the better of the argument – the ADM or the Corn Products tribunal – about the availability to Mexico of the countermeasures defense? Are investor rights analogous to the rights of third states? Are investor rights analogous to human rights? Is it problematic that these tribunals came to different conclusions with respect to the law?

A. **Primary Texts**

- US Model BIT, Art 18

B. **Essential Reading**

- **Archer Daniels Midland Co. & Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. Mexico**, Award (21 November 2007), available at [http://italaw.com/documents/ADMTateRedactedAward.pdf](http://italaw.com/documents/ADMTateRedactedAward.pdf) (focus on paras 110-180)

C. **Further Reading**


9. **Awards: annulment, recognition and enforcement**

**Dates: November 7 and 8, 2011**

This seminar focuses on what happens to awards after they are issued. What happens if the losing party wants to challenge the award? And how does the winning party enforce the award? The answers to these questions vary between ICSID and non-ICSID awards. Under the ICSID Convention, parties are not allowed to challenge awards before national courts but the system does
have an annulment procedure. Awards are also enforceable the same way as final court judgments, without domestic courts having an opportunity to review the award. For non-ICSID awards, the courts at the seat of the arbitration and at the place of enforcement have certain powers to review the awards, though they do not function as courts of appeal.

In completing the reading, consider the following questions:

- **ICSID Awards**: What is the procedure for seeking annulment? What is the difference between an annulment procedure and an appeal (*CMS v Argentina*)? What are the bases on which a party may seek an annulment (*CMS v Argentina*)? Can awards be annulled in part (*CMS v Argentina*)? What happens if an award is annulled? If an award is not annulled, how is it enforced? What powers do national courts have to review such awards?

- **Non-ICSID Awards**: What is the process for seeking review of non-ICSID awards? Which courts may review such awards and why? On what bases may a party seek to have an award set aside or not enforced (UNCITRAL Model Rules and New York Convention)? What standard do courts adopt in reviewing non-ICSID Awards and how was it applied in *Metalclad*? Is this standard appropriate or is it too exacting (Tollefson), too permissive (Brower II) or a form of dialectical review (Ahdieh)?

- **General questions**: Is it appropriate for courts to have limited or no power to review investment treaty awards? How is the answer to this question influenced by the characterization of investment treaty arbitration as a form of public international law, international commercial arbitration or public law? Are decisions of annulment committees any more legitimate than the decisions of the arbitral tribunal? Should there be a proper system for appealing investment awards?

### A. Primary Texts

- ICSID Convention, Arts 53-55
- NAFTA, Arts 1130 and 1136

### B. Essential Reading

- R Dolzer and C Schreuer, *Principles of International Investment Law* (2008), Ch 10 (Settling Investment Disputes, parts 2(m) and (n), pages 277-90)
C. Further reading

- UNCTAD, Course on Dispute Settlement, ICSID Part 2.8 (post-award remedies and procedures), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add7_en.pdf (focus on annulment)
- CAA and Vivendi v Argentina, Annulment decision (3 July 2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/vivendi_annulEN.pdf (focus on paras 1-2, 9-12, 61-70 (general guidance about annulment), 86-87, 93-115)

10. Lawmaking, Legitimacy and Conflicting Decisions

Dates: November 14 and 15, 2011

This seminar examines two systemic and controversial issues in the investment treaty field. The first is whether investment treaty law is being developed by the treaty parties or by investment tribunals. Although there is no formal doctrine of precedent in the investment field, tribunals and other participants routinely cite to prior awards when analyzing investment treaty provisions. If this results in a de facto body of precedent, what does this tell us about the lawmaking powers of tribunals relative to states? The second is how the field deals with the problem of inconsistent decisions. The latter is examined through the prism of a famous set of cases, Lauder v Czech Republic and CME v Czech Republic, where two tribunals reached opposite conclusions on the same set of facts. (Another well known example is the pair of SGS cases in the further reading that deal with the relationship between treaties and contracts.) This leads to questions about whether there should be a system for appealing conflicting investment treaty awards.

In completing the reading, consider the following questions:

- Lawmaking and legitimacy (Roberts): Are investment tribunals or states making international investment law? Is lawmaking by investment tribunals good or bad? Are there legitimate ways in which states can seek to control lawmaking by tribunals? Would control mechanisms amount to an abuse of process or a legitimate exercise of sovereign powers?
• Parallel proceedings and appellate review (Lauder and CME v Czech Republic): What was the relationship between Lauder and CME and why were two claims brought? Do multiple claims serve the interests of investors or states? Should either tribunal have refused to hear the case and, if so, on what basis? Should the Svea court have attempted to reconcile the decisions? Do you think that the conflicting decisions in Lauder and CME undermine the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration? What possibilities exist for avoiding or minimizing such conflicts?

A. Essential Reading

- Lauder v Czech Republic, Award (3 September 2001), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LauderAward.pdf (focus on admissibility objections, paras 153-91)

B. Further Reading

- Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (K Sauvant ed., Oxford, 2008), Chs 15 (Legum) and 16 (Paulsson)

11. The fairness and future of investment treaty law

Dates: November 21 and 22, 2011

This seminar focuses on some of the critiques of the fairness of investment treaty protection as well as possibilities for future reform. Anderson and Grusky provide an NGO perspective, arguing that investment treaty protection unfairly protects powerful investors at the expense of communities in developing states. Van Harten provides an academic perspective, arguing that investment arbitration
is not sufficiently open and accountable for a system of public law adjudication and that arbitrators might have incentives to render pro-investor awards. We review Franck’s empirical assessments of investment treaty claims and allegations of bias, considering the merits and limits of this sort of analysis. We also consider some of the amendments to the ICSID Rules and recent actions by a number of states to limit ICSID jurisdiction.

In completing the reading, consider the following questions:

- **NGO critique** (Anderson and Grusky, Franck): What are the most controversial aspects of investor-state dispute resolution? How do the revenues of claimant investors compare to the GDP of defending states? Which states are investors most likely to come from and which states are they most likely to sue? Are investor claimants or developing states more likely to win? What damages are claimed and what damages are awarded?

- **Public law critique** (Van Harten, ICSID amendments, Franck): What are Van Harten’s four critiques of investment arbitration? Do you agree with Van Harten’s accountability argument? What steps has ICSID taken to address the criticisms about openness and are these sufficient? What suggestions have been made for improving coherence? Are arbitrators systemically biased in favor of investors, either in fact or in appearances (Van Harten, Franck)? Is this a question that can be answered using empirical methods like the ones that Franck uses?

- **Recent developments**: What steps have Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia taken against ICSID jurisdiction? What steps has Ecuador taken? What recent policy decision did Australia take with respect to investment treaty arbitration? How have states like the United States and Canada been revising their model BITs? What happened to Norway’s draft model BIT? What do these developments tell us about the future of investment treaty arbitration?

A. **Essential Reading**

- S Franck, “Empirically evaluating claims about investment treaty arbitration”, 86 North Carolina L. Rev. 1 (2007) (focus on Introduction (pages 3-7) and Part IV.A-E (pages 24-35 and 44-66) (re-read from week 2)
- Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, described at [http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/e6da84a5-e1a8-462a-89e3-147a369efdb8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/232b4eb2-3248-48f9-aca5-16652b545f8/article_Icsid_Amends_its_Arbitration_Rules.pdf](http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/e6da84a5-e1a8-462a-89e3-147a369efdb8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/232b4eb2-3248-48f9-aca5-16652b545f8/article_Icsid_Amends_its_Arbitration_Rules.pdf)
B. Further Reading

- US Model BIT, Arts 10, 11 and 29


Dates: November 28 and 29, 2011

In preparation for this seminar, students will be required to provide a 2000 word critique of a work in progress that addresses the nature of the investment treaty system. More details will be provided in class.

13. Review Class

Date: December 5, 2011